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RECENT CASES
INFANTS-CRIMINAL LAW-CONFESSION BY A JUVENILE To POLICE
DURING CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION BEFORE JUVENILE COURT HAS
WAIVED JURISDICTION Is ADMISSABLE IN AN ADULT CRIMINAL PROSE-
CUTION
Appellant, a 16-year-old of subnormal intelligence, accompanied
by his parents, met with a police officer' at the courthouse for
questioning on an assault and robbery in which appellant was a
suspect.2 Before questioning began, the officer gave appellant a
standard Miranda3 warning, but did not inform him of the pos-
sibility of criminal prosecution as an adult.4 Appellant and his
parents stated that they understood the rights explained by the
officer, and appellant admitted involvement in the robbery. Appel-
lant was later given another Miranda warning, and after a waiver
of those rights, signed a statement implicating himself in the rob-
bery. The juvenile court subsequently waived jurisdiction 5 and re-
ferred appellant for prosecution as an adult to the County District
Court where he was convicted of aggravated robbery. He appealed.
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a confession
given by a juvenile during police custodial interrogation prior to
juvenile court waiver of jurisdiction is admissible in adult criminal
1. The police officer was a school liason officer assigned to investigation of crimes
which youths attending certain schools were suspected of having committed. As school
liason officer, he did not wear a police uniform, display a badge, or drive a police squad
car. The officer and appellant had previously met on several occasions and he had agreed
to assist appellant in obtaining a job.
2. A warrant had been Issued for appellant's arrest, but he and his parents had come
to the courthouse voluntarily.
S. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda held that the prosecution may not
use statements stemming from custodial interrogation unless the suspect has been informed.
1. of his privilege against self-incrimination.
2. that anything he says may be used as evidence against him.
3. of his right to counsel, and if he cannot afford counsel, counsel will be ap-
pointed prior to questioning.
Id. at 444. To be valid, a waiver of these rights must be voluntarily and intelligently made.
4. Appellant contended that the police officer told him he would only be sent back to a
juvenile institution if he confessed. The police officer stated that the discussion of possible
punishment did not occur until after appellant's confession. The trial court accepted the
police officer's version of the incident.
5. M.S.A. § 260.125(1) (1971) allows for children fourteen and over to be referred for
prosecution in a criminal court if they have violated a state law or local ordinance and a
hearing has been held at which it found that the child is not amenable to Juvenile treat-
ment or the public safety will be served by such referral.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
proceedings after such waiver. The juvenile must be appraised of
his constitutional rights under Miranda, voluntarily and intelligently
waive those rights, and he must understand the adversary nature
of the questioning. State v. Loyd, - Minn. - , 212 N.W.2d 671
(1973).
When a child commits an offense the state assumes a position
as parens patriae6 and cares for the child.7 Juvenile proceedings
are conducted in a non-criminal atmosphere, premised upon the
theory that the primary functions are guidance and rehabilitation
rather than punishment." In most states children under the juris-
diction of the juvenile court may be transferred to the adult criminal
justice system for prosecution." The decision whether to transfer
the child to an adult criminal court or to dispose of the case in
the juvenile court is critically important. 10 There is a presumption
that the child will benefit from the juvenile court proceedings, and
only in rare11 circumstances 12 will he be transferred to an adult
criminal court. Before the juvenile court may waive jurisdiction
over the child and transfer him for adult prosecution, the juvenile
court must conduct a hearing for the purpose of determining whether
it would be in the best interests of the child and state to waive
or retain jurisdiction. 3 Juvenile jurisdiction is to be waived only
when the child is found to be an unfit subject for juvenile rehabili-
tative measures. 14 The juvenile court must grant the child's counsel
access to all pertinent records, 15 and if jurisdiction is waived the
court must state its reasons for such action.'6 Juvenile delinquency
proceedings which may lead to the child's commitment in a state
institution must measure up to standards of due process and fair
treatment 7 including: written notice of the specific charges; 1'8 no-
tification to the child and his parents of the child's right to counsel; 19
appointment of counsel for indigents; 20 the privilege against self-
6. Parens Patriae literally means "father of his country." In England the king, in the
United States, the state. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
7. E.g., In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967); Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 558
(D.C. Cir. 1959) ; State v. Couch, 294 S.W.2d 636, 639 (Mo. 1956).
8. E.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55 (1966) ; State v. Gullings, 244 Ore.
173, -, 416, P.2d 311, 312-19 (1966).
9. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 (1974) ; M.S.A. § 260.125 (1971) ; S.D.C.L. § 26-11-4
(1967).
10. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556-57, 560 (1966).
11. Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161, 164-65 (D.C. Cir. 1961). Of all North Dakota
juvenile court cases, only 1.6% were waived to criminal court in 1971. 1971 JUVENILE COURT
STATISTICS 11.
12. Kent v. United States, 388 U.S. 541, 560-61 (1966).
13. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
14. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(d) (1974); M.S.A. § 260.125(1) (1971). Of. In
Interest of Patterson, 210 Kan. 245, 499 P.2d 1131 (1972). The gravity of the offense is
not the controlling factor in determining waiver.
15. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966).
16. Id. at 561.
17. Id. at 562.
18. In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967).




incrimination; 2 1 and confrontation and cross-examination of adverse
witnesses. 22
Because of the informal and non-punitive atmosphere of the
juvenile court, the child may be induced to make inculpatory state-
ments when he might have exercised his right to remain silent
had he known that criminal prosecution could result.22  Many states
have eliminated this danger by prohibiting the admission in any
other court of evidence adduced in the juvenile court.24
Loyd dealt with the admissibility in a criminal prosecution, of
an otherwise valid confession given by a juvenile during police
custodial interrogation while the child was within the exclusive25
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.2 The court in Loyd and the ma-
jority of the courts 27 hold that a confession by a juvenile while
the child is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is admissible
as evidence in an adult criminal prosecution after waiver of juris-
diction, if the child had been informed of his constitutional rights2s
and voluntarily and intelligently waived those rights. 29 It has been
consistently held that the age of the child or mental subnormality"°
is not ipso facto a bar to an effective waiver of Miranda rights.2 1
In many jurisdictions neither the child's parents nor counsel must
be present for the juvenile to make a valid waiver and confession.22
The child must waive his rights himself; a waiver by parents and
counsel on his behalf is unacceptable.32a
One of the first cases to deal with the question of the admis-
sibility of inculpatory statements made while the child was within
21. Id. at 55.
22. Id. at 57. See also In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (In juvenile delinquency pro-
ceedings the standard of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt).
23. State v. Loyd, - Minn.-, 212 N.W.2d 671, 674 (1973).
24. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-33(2) (1974) ; M.S.A. § 260.211(1) (1971) ; COLO., R.S.
§ 22-8-1(3) (b) (1963); See generally 1 J. WIGMORE, EvmENcE § 196(3) (3rd ed. Supp.
1972).
25. M.S.A. § 260.111(1) (1971) states:
Except as provided in section 260.125, the juvenile court has original and
exclusive jurisdiction In proceedings concerning any child who Is alleged to
be delinquent ...
Id.
26. State v. Loyd, - Minn.-, 212 N.W.2d 671, 674 (1973).
27. People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365, 432 P.2d 202, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967), cert. denied,
392 U.S. 945 (1968) ; State v. Orteger, 77 N. Mex. 7, 419 P.2d 219 (1966) ; Commonwealth
v. Porter, 449 Pa. 153, 295 A.2d 811 (1972) ; Mitchell v. State, 464 S.W.2d 307 (1971).
28. In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Juveniles as well as adults must be appraised of
their Miranda rights before custodial interrogation.
29. Arnold v. State, 265 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1972) ; People v. Baker, 9 Ill. App. 3d 654, 292
N.E.2d 760 (1973) ; Coney v. State, 491 S.W.2d 501 (1973).
30. E.g., People v. Baker, 9 Ill. App. 3d 654, 292 N.E.2d 760 (1973) ; Commonwealth v.
Darden, 441 Pa. 41, 271 A.2d 257 (1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 1004 (1971).
31. But cf. Commonwealth v. Cobbs, 452 Pa. 397, 305 A.2d 25 (1973). Confessions of
Juveniles must be scrutinized with greater care than those of adults.
32. Commonwealth v. Porter, 449 Pa. 153, 295 A.2d 311 (1972); People v. Hester, 39
Ill. 2d 489, 237 N.E.2d 466 (1968). Contra, U.S. 6x rel B. v. Shelly, 305 F. Supp. 55
(E.D.N.Y. 1969), modified 430 F.2d 215 (1970); McClentock v. State, 253 Ind. 333, 253
N.E.2d 233 (1969).
32a. See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966).
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the jurisdiction of the juvenile court was Harling v. United States."3
Harling held that all statements made by a juvenile during custodial
interrogation before the juvenile court has waived jurisdiction are
inadmissible as evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecution-"
Although the Supreme Court 6 and state courts 7 have denied
admission of inculpatory statements which were obtained by police
misconduct, the jurisdictions which have rendered decisions on the
admissibility of an otherwise valid confession have unanimously re-
jected the per se exclusionary rule of Harling.38
The Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Maloney 9 adopted a
modified Harling exclusionary rule. Maloney held that a child's
inculpatory statement to police while the child was within the juris-
diction of the juvenile court was admissible in a criminal court
only if the child and his parents are advised of the child's Miranda
rights before questioning and are expressly informed of the possi-
bility that the child may be remanded for trial as an adult. 40
In State v. Gullings41 the Supreme Court of Oregon held that
inculpatory statements made by juveniles during police custodial
interrogation are admissible in criminal prosecutions after waiver
of jurisdiction if the child is advised of his Miranda rights and
it is made clear to the child that criminal prosecution may result.
No express statement that criminal prosecution may result is re-
quired if the "information is secured in a setting that is so patently
adversarial as to be understood by the child.' '4 2 However, since
the waiver of rights signed by the child stated that any information
secured could be used against him in a criminal prosecution,"3
the police in Gullings did expressly warn the child of the possibility
of criminal prosecution.
Other jurisdictions require only a Miranda warning and a proper
33. 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961); accord Kent v. United States, 883 U.S. 541, 5.44 n.2
(1966) ; Harrison v. United States, 359 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
34. Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961). "It would offend these
principles of fundamental fairness to allow admissions made by the child in the non-
criminal and non-punitive setting of juvenile proceedings to be used for the purpose of
securing his criminal conviction and punishment .. " Id. at 163.
35. Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161, 164 (D.C. Cir. 1961). But cf. Riddick v.
United States, 326 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1963) State v. Kramer, 72 Wash. 2d 904, 435 P.2d
970 (1967), cert. denied 398 U.S. 833 (1968).
36. Galegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962) Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
37. People v. Townsend, 33 N.Y.2d 37, 300 N.E.2d 722, 347 N.Y.S.2d 187 (1973).
38. State v. Loyd, - Minn.- , 212 N.W.2d 671 (1973) ; State v. Sinderson, 455 S.W.2d
486 (Mo. 1970) ; State v. Gullengs, 244 Ore. 173, 416 P.2d 311 (1966) ; Mitchell v. State, 3
Tenn. Crim. App. 494, 464 S.W.2d 307 (1971).
39. 102 Ariz. 495, 433 P.2d 625 (1967). Accord State v. Councilman, 105 Ariz. 145, 460
P.2d 640 (1969) ; State v. Caro, 103 Ariz. 37, 436 P.2d 586 (1968).
40. State v. Hardy, 107 Ariz. 583, 491 P.2d 17 (1971), overruled Maloney to the extent
that Maloney required parental presence and consent for an effective waiver of Miranda
rights,
41. 244 Ore. 173, 416 P.2d 311 (1966). Accord State v. Prater, 77 Wash. 2d 526, 463 P.2d
640 (1970) ; State v. Davis, 3 Wash. App. 684, 477 P.2d 44 (1970).
42. 244 Ore. 173, -, 416 P.2d 311, 314 (1966).
43. Id. at -, 416 P.2d at 312.
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waiver of those rights to make a child's inculpatory statement admis-
sible in a criminal prosecution after waiver of jurisdiction by the
juvenile court. 44
The Minnesota Supreme Court held in Loyd that neither the
doctrine of "fundamental fairness, '"4 nor M.S.A. § 260.21148 barred
the admission in a criminal prosecution of inculpatory statements
made during police custodial interrogation while the juvenile is under
the exclusive jurisdiction47 of the juvenile court. "The statutory
prohibition is of evidence given in the juvenile court-which does
not include police investigatory activities involving juveniles." 48 Al-
though the Loyd decision purported to follow Gullings,,4 Loyd gives
the trial court more latitude in determining whether a juvenile's
inculpatory statement is admissible in a criminal prosecution. The
Gullings court held that for such statements to be admissible it
must be "made clear to the juvenile that criminal responsibility
can result." 50 Loyd held that awareness of possible criminal res-
ponsibility is necessary, but such awareness may often be imputed
to a juvenile by the fact that the police are conducting the inter-
rogation.5 1
Under the Loyd court's decision in State v. Hogan,52 parental
presence is not necessary for a juvenile's valid waiver of his Miranda
rights.55
The Supreme Court has recognized that formidable 'doubt has
been cast upon the reliability of confessions by children.5 The Har-
ling court recognized the danger in allowing the admission of inculpa-
tory statements in criminal proceedings when it said:
Moreover, if admissions obtained in juvenile proceedings
before waiver of jurisdiction may be introduced in adult pro-
ceedings after waiver, the juvenile proceedings are made to
44. People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d'365, 432 P.2d 202, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967), cert. denied,
392 U.S. 945 (1968) ; Mitchell v. State, 3 Tenn. Crim. App. 494, 464 S.W.2d 307 (1971).
45. - Minn.-- , 212 N.W.2d 671, 676-77 (1973).
46. - Minn.- , 212 N.W.2d 671, 677 (1973). M.S.A. § 260.211(1) (1971) reads in part
* * , any evidence given by the child in the juvenile court shall not be admissible as
evidence against him in any case or proceeding in any other court ... "
47. M.S.A. § 260.111 (1971) states that the juvenile court has original and exclusive
Jurisdiction over minors, until waiver of jurisdiction by that court.
48. - Minn.-, 212 N.W.2d 671, 677 (1979).
49. State v. Gullings, 244 Ore. 173, 416 P.2d 311, 313 (1966).
50. Id. at 313.
51. - Minn.- , 212 N.W.2d 671, 677 (1973).
52. - Minn.-- , 212 N.W.2d 664 (1973).
53. Ferguson & Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 39 (1970),
reprinted in JUvENZiLE COURT JOURNAL 13 (Spring 1970). When the fact that parental pres-
ence is not necessary for a valid waiver of Miranda rights Is coupled with the results of a
recent test disclosing that 96% of those juveniles tested (14-year-olds), did not understand
their Miranda rights although they had waived them, the danger of the child making an
improper waiver is substantial. Id. at 54.
54. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1. 52 (1967) ; See Miranda Guarantees In the Juvenile Corwrt,
7 SANTA CLARA LAW. 114, 127 (1966); The Juvenile Offender and Self-Incrimination, 40
WASH. L. REv. 189, 200-01 (1965).
55. Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161, 164 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (emphasis in original).
209
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serve as an adjunct to and part of the adult criminal process.
This would destroy the Juvenile Court's parens patriae rela-
tion to the child and would violate the non-criminal philos-
ophy which underlies the Juvenile Court Act.55
A few jurisdictions, including North Dakota, have enacted stat-
utes prohibiting the use of a juvenile's inculpatory statements ob-
tained during police custodial interrogation in adult criminal prose-
cutions. In 1969 the North Dakota state legislature adopted the Uni-
form Juvenile Court Act,56 which provides for the juvenile courts
and governs their procedure. 57 The Uniform Juvenile Court Act
was drawn up to fully meet the mandates of the recent Supreme
Court decisions58 and to preserve the basic objectives of the juvenile
court.59 North Dakota juvenile law restricts the admissibility in
criminal prosecutions of inculpatory statements given before the
juvenile court waiver of jurisdiction to an extent approaching the
per se exclusionary rule expressed in Harling. North Dakota Century
Code § 27-20-34 (4) reads:
Statements made by the child after being taken into cus-
tody and prior to the service of notice under subsection 160
or at the hearing under this section are not admissible against
him over objection in the criminal proceedings following the
transfer.
The danger of a child making an inculpatory statement that
is the product of an improper 61 waiver of Miranda rights is avoided
since such statements are not admissible in a criminal proceeding
over objection if the statements are made prior to the written notice
that a hearing for the purpose of determining waiver of jurisdiction
will be held. 2 Inculpatory statements made after a child's otherwise
valid waiver of Miranda rights are not admissible if he was unaware
56. The Uniform Juvenile Court Act, S.L. 1969, ch. 289, effective July 1, 1969, repealed
all prior juvenile court law, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-16-1 through 27-16-41 (1960). The Uni-
form Juvenile Court Act was enacted as N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-20-01 to -59 (1974). The
Uniform Juvenile Court Act was approved by the National Conference of Commissions on
Uniform State Laws, and the American Bar Association, in 1968. At present North Dakota
is the only state to have adopted the Uniform Juvenile Court Act. Vermont adopted a pre-
liminary draft of the Act on July 1, 1968. VT. STAT. ANN. tit, 38 §§ 631-666 (1974). Georgia
has adopted a substantial portion of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act, but with numerous
omissions, variations, and additional material. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 24A-101 to 24A-4001
(1973).
57. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-20-01 to 59 (1974).
58. Prefatory Note, Uniform Juvenile Court Act, 9 (U.L.A.) 397, 398 (1973).
59. Id.
60. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(1) (1971). The applicable portion provides that:
Notice in writing of the time, place, and purpose of the hearing is given to
the child and his parents, guardian, or other custodian at least three days be-
fore the hearing; . . .
61. For a "proper" waiver of Miranda rights it is necessary that those rights be in-
telligently and voluntarily waived. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486, 444 (1966).
62. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(4) (1974).
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that he may be transferred for criminal prosecution. Another im-
portant factor of this section is that in presenting his case against
transfer, the child will not be hampered by the prospect that what
is presented in the hearing will be used against him in a criminal
prosecution." Such evidence is inadmissible in a subsequent crim-
inal prosecution.6 5
In Minnesota a child of subnormal intelligence may legally waive
his Miranda rights without parental presence or advice of counsel.
Under Loyd, inculpatory statements stemming from this questionable
waiver may be used in an adult criminal prosecution. Fairness
requires that the child and his parents be aware of the possibility
of criminal prosecution before making inculpatory statements which
may be admissible in a criminal court. To avoid impairment of
the juvenile court's parens patriae function the juvenile proceedings
must be insulated from the adult criminal justice system. For the
non-punitive and rehabilitative atmosphere of the juvenile court to
function properly, the atmosphere must be one of trust and free disclo-
sure between the child and representatives of the juvenile court.66 Re-
cent studies have indicated that few adult criminal convictions are
lost as a result of inadmissible confessions because improved police
techniques of evidence gathering are replacing reliance on the con-
fession.6 7 The exclusionary rules of the North Dakota Century Code
(Uniform Juvenile Court Act) should not hamper the state in prose-
cuting cases transferred from the juvenile court. With the greatly
increased mobility of families and children, there is a need for
interstate cooperation in the handling of delinquent children. North
Dakota's enactment of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act has assured
the state and its citizens of juvenile law providing the youthful
offender with the constitutional safeguards of due process while
retaining the benefits of parens patriae.68
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63. Id. The child and his parents would be aware of the possibility of criminal prosecu-
tion after the receipt of the written notice of the transfer hearing as provided for in N.D.
CENT. CODE § 27-20-34 (1)(c) (1974).
64. N D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(4) (1974). See Commissioner's Note, 9 Uniform Juvenile
Court Act (U.L.A.) 430, 431 (1973).
65. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-27(2) (1974) (valid out of court confession must
be corroborated to support a finding of delinquency) ; accord In Re W.J. 116 N.J. Super,
462, 282 A.2d 770 (1971). See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-3(2) (1974) (disposition of
child and evidence adduced in juvenile court may not be admitted in any other court, ex-
ception).
66. State v. Loyd, -Minn.- , 212 N.W.2d 671, 674 (1973).
67. See Wald, Ayres, Hess, Schantz, Whitebread, Interrogation in New Haven: The Im-
pact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1578-1600 (1967) ; Seeburger & Wettick, Miranda in
Pittsburgh-A Statistial Study, 29 U. PITT. L. REv. 1 (1967).
68. For analysis of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act in its entirety see The Uniform
Juvenile Court Act, 48 N.D. L. REv. 93 (1971-1972); In re R.Y. 189 N.W.2d 644 (N.D.
1971).
